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Wireless communication goes through a custom security ASIP, called SISC (Smart-Implant Security Core),
which runs an energy-efficient security protocol. The security core is powered by RF-harvested energy until
it performs external-reader authentication, providing an elegant defense mechanism against battery Denial-
of-Service (DoS) and other, more common attacks. The system has been evaluated based on a realistic case
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1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of an Implantable Medical Device (IMD) is to measure and/or treat
physiological quantities within the body. Millions of people are currently carrying IMDs
[Roger et al. 2011], prominent instances of which are pacemakers regulating heart rate
beating, IntraCardiac Defibrillators (ICDs) managing cardiac arrhythmia, neurostim-
ulators treating Parkinson’s disease, and cochlear implants restoring hearing. Mod-
ern IMDs are being increasingly equipped with wireless communication capabilities
[Gollakota et al. 2011; Halperin et al. 2008] due to introducing certain benefits, pri-
marily as follows [Varshney 2003]:
—Improved at-home health care: Patients will not need to visit their doctor as fre-
quently for check-ups; implants will periodically download data wirelessly to a base
station at home and, from there, transmit it over the Internet to the doctor’s office
computer or PDA.
—Up-to-date device functionality: Implants will be in vivo (re)programmed or
(re)calibrated by the doctor’s (external) programmer device to cope with interpatient
variation, device malfunction, sensor drift, and so on.
All its benefits notwithstanding, wireless communication also opens the door to un-
wanted device access, which can lead to personal data theft or, worse, implant incapac-
itation [Halperin et al. 2008]. Since modern IMDs are embedded computing systems
in actuality, specially targeted computer viruses or malware could infect implantable
devices and use them to spread, potentially damaging a large patient base [Gasson
2010]. Public awareness on the matter is gradually catching up [Leavitt 2010; Strydis
et al. 2008] and successful, in vitro attacks on implantable devices have already been
demonstrated [Halperin et al. 2008; Li et al. 2011] to verify that such fears are not
unwarranted. The attacks on the Epilepsy Foundation website—where seizures were
induced in some epileptic patients by replacing website content with rapidly flashing
images [Poulson 2008]—have led to the certainty that malicious attacks on IMDs are
simply a matter of time and, therefore, that security is required in order to protect the
steadily increasing number of patients carrying wireless IMDs.
Due to the safety-critical nature of IMDs, an implant requires a robust security
protocol that does not allow access to individuals without knowledge of a secret pass-
word. At the same time, the protocol has to be accessible enough to allow unrestricted
access to any first-aid responder with medical expertise in case of patient (e.g., heart
attack, seizure) or device (e.g., malfunction, low battery) emergency.
Trading high-security for high-accessibility levels is just one of many conflicting
requirements a designer has to take into account. Another one is device autonomy:
Most IMDs use a battery as their energy source. In order to prolong battery life and, in
so doing, avoid life-threatening and costly battery replacement (through surgery), IMDs
primarily need to be ultra-low-power (ULP) devices. This poses serious limitations
on the number of security protocols applicable to implants. Robust security protocols
typically are prohibitively taxing on battery power.
For coping with the unique set of implant requirements in ultra-low power and
ultra-high safety, smart security schemes such as “zero-power defense” [Halperin et al.
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2008] (to be discussed later on) and profiling studies on implant-friendly, symmetric-
encryption algorithms [Strydis et al. 2008] have already appeared in the literature.
Although more studies on the various security aspects of implants are needed, we
believe that the design and implementation of a complete system for IMD security
is much needed. Such an IMD system architecture is expected to provide adequate
security (i) without compromising the functionality and performance of the IMD,
(ii) without exceeding the maximum peak power, and (iii) while maintaining a
sufficiently low energy overhead.
In line with the aforementioned challenges, in this work we present (i) a new sys-
tem architecture and (ii) a matching secure communication protocol for shield-
ing IMDs against various pertinent attacks. We also design, implement, and optimize
(iii) a low-power security processor for IMDs that executes the communication pro-
tocol, and we provide detailed performance, power, energy, and area results of the com-
plete system. The security processor is called Smart-Implant Security Core (SISC)
and is designed to work independently from the primary implant module; in this case,
a previously published artificial-pancreas module has been selected. The SISC does so
by scavenging RF power from any active wireless communication link for initiating
secure data exchange, rather than wasting the implant battery.
Concisely, with this work we make the following novel contributions:
—We identify multiple potential IMD attack scenarios and propose a secure protocol
for communication between the IMD and an external reader;
—We propose a new implant system architecture that guarantees security and safety
through our security protocol and by completely decoupling the security and implant
application tasks in terms of processing and powering needs;
—We provide a new, low-power security ASIP and ANSI C-compiler for facilitating
the security protocol. Use of an ASIP executing instructions has the advantage of
allowing complete updating of the protocol even after device manufacturing and
implantation; and
—We demonstrate the feasibility of our solution by presenting synthesis-based results
of a new proof-of-concept system implementing the secure IMD architecture and
identify the trivial overheads it introduces in terms of energy and device resources.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents background in-
formation and an overview of related works in the field. In Section 3, we introduce
the new system architecture, detailing the proposed security protocol and the SISC
architecture. Since the IMD security topic is far from being established, in Section 4
we discuss a few educated assumptions made to complete this work, we present the
experimental setup used, and, finally, we report on the overheads introduced in terms
of performance, area cost, and power and energy consumption of the new, secure IMD
system. Overall conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Compromising implant functionality and privacy can have serious repercussions for the
device host. These can range from blackmail and social segregation (for instance, if an
employer can identify that a potential employee carries an IMD, he might feel inclined
to not hire that person) to treatment prevention and even death. Securing an IMD
against such attacks is, thus, a major challenge. There are, however, more challenges
that need to be addressed in the process: Halperin et al. [2008] draw attention to
the tradeoff between security, on one hand, and device resources, accessibility, and
usability, on the other. In this section, we will provide background information and
present related works dealing with these challenges in IMD security.
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Table I. Typical Security System Components and Various Implementations Thereof
Entity authentication and message integrity can be replaced by a message authentication protocol. Components
in bold are adopted in this work.
Key – Initial key distribution (always needed).
management – Offline distribution system / online distribution system (distribution of session key
to authorized users).
– Replacement / no replacement.
Entity
authentication




– MAC (if the two sides trust
each other).
– Mutual auth. (3-way challenge-
response protocol).
– Digital signature (if the two




– Message echoing (as verifica-
tion).
Freshness – Counter.
– Hash function. – Random Number (RN)
generation.
Confidentiality – Symmetric (or private) cipher encryption / asymmetric (or public) cipher
encryption.
2.1. Security Components
Every security system can be divided into the following components [van der Lubbe
1998]:
—KeyManagement involves the generation, distribution, and (periodic) replacement
of keys used for encrypting the message;
—Entity Authentication identifies if a message originates from a trusted entity;
—Message Integrity confirms a message has been received correctly; and
—Confidentiality prevents from disclosing a message to unauthorized entities.
These components can be implemented in a number of ways, as shown in Table I.Mes-
sage authentication (MAC) protocols provide both entity authentication and message
integrity. Obviously, there does not exist a single secure communication protocol that
can be efficient for every system. For each system, the most suitable protocol should be
selected with respect to the available resources and constraints as well as to the attack
types to which the system is susceptible. An extensive study of the various alternatives
in Table I has been presented in Siskos [2011] and the interested reader is encouraged
to refer to his work. In this article, we will focus on selecting the components best
suited for building the envisioned secure IMDs, to be presented in Section 3.
2.2. IMD Switching Modes and Access Control
While the components in Table I guarantee device security, provisions must also be in
place to guarantee implant accessibility and safety [Halperin et al. 2008]. Accessibility
plays a key role in emergency situations such as a heart attack or falling unconscious. In
such situations, it is crucial that IMD security mechanisms do not prevent treatment.
It is clear that secure access is required during normal mode of operation and fail-open
access during emergencies. In this section, we present and discuss recently proposed
methods for allowing unsecured access during emergency situations.
It has been suggested by Schechter [2010] that the encryption key is tattooed onto pa-
tients using ultraviolet micropigmentation near the scar where the IMD is implanted,
making it available in case of emergency. The main drawbacks of such a tattoo are (i)
the need for a blacklight to be always present during an emergency so as to read the
key, (ii) a marginally increased risk of key theft, and (iii) cumbersome key replacement.
Furthermore, a patient survey has shown that tattooing the key, using regular or ultra-
violet ink, is generally disliked and may lead to stigmatization [Denning et al. 2010].
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Switching between secure and emergency modes can also be achieved by using a
magnetic switch. In this technique proposed by Halperin et al. [2008], the security
protocol is active as long as the magnetic switch is on. When it is turned off (by
physically swiping a magnet extradermally over the implant), unsecured access is
enabled. However, an adversary may have significantly powerful equipment at their
disposal capable of toggling the security mode, thus bypassing the security of this
approach [Halperin et al. 2008] as well. Furthermore, systems using this technique
may be prone to accidental mode switching when in the presence of relatively strong
magnetic fields.
Distance-bounding-based access control has been proposed by Rasmussen et al.
[2009]. Security is achieved by using (i) a credential held by the reader, which shares a
secret key with the IMD, and (ii) the proximity-based protocol. During normal mode of
operation, the private key is used for allowing secure access to the IMD. In emergency
mode, the proximity-based protocol is used: Anyone in close proximity to the implant
(<10cm) can have access to it. By having the valid range in emergency mode be much
smaller than in normal mode, the risk of the implant being attacked is significantly
reduced. However, recent work in the RFID field has shown that current distance-
based protocols are vulnerable to distance-hijacking attacks [Cremers et al. 2012] and,
therefore, we question the security of distance-bounding protocols for IMDs.
A number of access schemes rely on an external device to provide accessible security
to the IMD. Such a device could, for example, be hidden in the form of a necklace or
watch. In the IMD-Cloaker [Denning et al. 2008], IMDGuard [Xu et al. 2011], Amulet
[Sorber et al. 2012], and Personal-Security-Device [Pournaghshband et al. 2012] ap-
proaches, the external device acts as a security middleman, preventing secured access
to the IMD when the two are in close proximity. If the external device is physically dis-
tanced from the IMD, fail-open access ensues. In the IMD-Shield approach [Gollakota
et al. 2011], the incoming and outgoing messages to the IMD are jammed, preventing
all access to the IMD while the jammer is present (i.e., only emergency mode is facili-
tated). This approach requires no modifications to the IMD, making it ideal to enhance
already implanted IMDs with security. The main drawback of the aforementioned ap-
proaches is the vulnerability of the IMD when the cloaker or jammer is not present.
For example, the device may be lost, stolen, or simply forgotten.
Criticality-aware systems change their mode of operation based on monitoring a set
of critical variables [Gupta et al. 2006]. Halperin et al. [2008] have proposed to use
criticality awareness for IMDs, where the IMD itself determines if the patient is in an
emergency situation based on physiological parameters and provides open access in
case of emergency. Hei et al. [2010] have proposed to use the patient’s heartbeat as a
biometric trigger; for example, the IMDmay switch to emergency mode when the heart
rate is above (or below, in case of cardiac arrest) a certain threshold. While criticality
awareness may seem promising, there is yet to be found a (set of ) parameter(s) that
unambiguously capture an emergency-only situation.
2.3. Low-Power Security Techniques
Having in mind that the aforementioned works address security, accessibility, and
safety mechanisms for IMDs, we should also pay attention to the overheads that they
may introduce, be they in the form of performance, chip area, or—most importantly—
energy consumption.
Lean security protocols tailored to IMDs have already been presented by Beck et al.
[2011] and Hosseini-Khayat [2011]. Both protocols propose symmetric encryption us-
ing ciphers of low computational complexity. Besides, symmetric (block) ciphers are
considered to have lower computational complexity (and, thus, power and energy re-
quirements) compared to asymmetric ones (which feature simpler key management)
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[Martin Feldhofer and Wolkerstorfer 2004]. While both proposed protocols promise
low-power security, actual power results and cryptanalysis, which are essential when
proposing a new security protocol, are not provided. Furthermore, we consider both
protocols prone to battery Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, as no extra precautions are
taken to prevent invalid requests from draining the implant battery.
In an attempt to combine low energy costs with device usability, Halperin et al.
[2008] have proposed three zero-power techniques against radio-based IMD attacks:
(i) zero-power notification for patients, (ii) zero-power authentication, and (iii) zero-
power symmetric-key exchange, utilizing the first two techniques. Even though key
management is missing from the schemes, these three defenses are based on RF energy
harvesting on the side of the IMD. This is achieved by adding an RFID-like module
to the IMD and making sure the techniques maintain scant power budgets. This last
work introduces the interesting idea of RFID-style energy harvesting for performing
security-related computations in implants.
The work presented in this article differs from Halperin et al. [2008] as follows:
(1) The protocol described in Halperin et al. [2008] provides one-way authentication
and, after the reader has been authenticated, allows (unsecured) communication
between the reader and IMD. In contrast, we provide mutual authentication in
order to prevent spoofing attacks on the reader and facilitate encryption throughout
the session, preventing message eavesdropping or alternation.
(2) In Halperin et al. [2008], RC5 [Rivest 1995] is suggested as the encryption algo-
rithm. A recent survey on ciphers for implantable devices [Strydis et al. 2008] has
shown that the MISTY1 encryption algorithm [Ohta and Matsui 2000] is superior
to RC5 in terms of power consumption and is thus our choice for encryption.
(3) Halperin et al. [2008] present a prototype using an RFID-like module (WISP) for
executing the security protocol using a standard 16-bit RISCmicroprocessor [Smith
et al. 2006]. In contrast, we have designed a 32-bit ASIP processor that has been
optimized for executing the MISTY1 cipher in order to minimize the performance
and energy consumption overheads. Moreover, using an ASIP processor allows us to
change the used security protocol and cipher in case their security is compromised.
(4) In Halperin et al. [2008], a zero-power defense against DoS attacks is proposed
by having the IMD operate on RF-harvested energy prior to authentication. How-
ever, no actual implementation is presented. In this article, we propose, imple-
ment, and evaluate a system architecture capable of providing such zero-power
defenses. Specifically, we demonstrate zero-power security is achievable by power-
ing it through an RF link without affecting the main implant functionality.
Secure, wireless communication at minimal energy cost is a well-studied problem
in RFID tags and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [Ko et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2010].
Although IMDs share similar security requirements, there are various key differences
setting them apart. In this discussion, relevant ones are (i) emergency mode: IMDs
require an emergency mode, which bypasses regular security (seen in Section 2.2),
and (ii) power harvesting: IMDs may harvest energy from the human body through,
among others, piezoelectric and thermodynamic effects, reducing or removing the need
for battery-powered operations [Olivo et al. 2011]. An example of an energy-harvesting
implantable device is presented in Nazhandali et al. [2005], where an ultra-low-power
intraocular pressure sensor, consisting of a pressure sensor, processor, andmemories, is
powered by converting temperature gradients within the eyeball to electricity. Wireless
IMDs may also harvest power over a generic RF link or through magnetic coupling
(as many commercial devices do at the moment) of more than ∼25μW, which is the
maximum attainable with most commercial RFID antennas [FCC 2003]. This results
in a typically higher power budget for the mission-critical IMDs compared to either
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the disposable, cheap RFID tags or the physically remote or inaccessible sensor motes,
where security strength is often exchanged for power reduction [Cam et al. 2003;
Rieback et al. 2008].
Due to these significant differences, we do not consider security protocols and mech-
anisms typically used in the RFID and WSN fields to be directly applicable to IMDs.
On the other hand, designing a security protocol from scratch is generally not common
practice as it requires a long time to fully test, to perform cryptanalysis on it, and so
on. In Section 3.3, we will revisit this dilemma and propose a suitable solution.
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE FOR SECURE IMPLANTS
Achieving security for an implant can be divided into two parts. The first part, present
in every secure system, is to make the system resilient to attacks. The second part,
not so common in other secure systems, is to make the implant very power and energy
efficient. Excess power or energy consumption as well as unauthorized access could
lead to compromising the implant host’s health and even to death. In this section, we
will go through the process of identifying potential IMD attacks, selecting the system
architecture, the secure communication protocol, and the ISA of the new security core,
in order to deliver a secure yet energy-efficient and versatile system.
3.1. IMD-Related Attacks
To build a secure IMD, we should start by listing the possible attacks that can be
mounted. IMDs appear to be susceptible to the following array of attacks:
(1) Entity impersonation: Impersonation of the implant or of a reader through, for
example, a replay attack. A replay attack is a network attack whereby a valid data
transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. Such an attack
may be used for preventing treatment by, for example, scrambling the order of
packets arriving at the IMD or, worse, allowing full access to the IMD by repeating
previously intercepted access credentials.
(2) Message alteration: Altering (malicious or accidental) of the message contents
during communication. Altering may be used to inject malicious and potentially
dangerous commands to the IMD.
(3) Message eavesdropping: Eavesdropping on the messages, thus compromising
sensitive patient data. Note that the privacy of this data has to be guaranteed by
any device handling medical data under the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act1 (US) and European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 (EU).
(4) BatteryDoS: Battery DoS occurs when the adversary indirectly causes the battery
to discharge. For instance, if one repeatedly requests a specific operation from the
implant, it will repeatedly run the same authentication protocol for analyzing the
request and, eventually, deplete its power source, even if the request does not result
in authentication.
(5) Jam DoS: This type of DoS occurs when the adversary blocks the communication
channel of an implant by repeatedly sending it valid or invalid messages.
(6) Insider attack: When the attacker is a trusted party with proper access creden-
tials to the device. For instance, the patient’s doctor can alter information in the
IMD memory log to hide evidence of malpractice.
Moreover, any DoS attack may interfere with an implant’s main functionality by
having it spend time on handling the incoming requests. All of these attacks may, to
a certain extent, pose a threat to an IMD, yet in this work we will address attacks
(1) through (4). In an IMD, the communication channel will be used infrequently
and mostly to communicate non-mission-critical information to a base station; even
1US Pub. Law 104-191, est. 1996.
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Fig. 1. Proposed IMD system architecture, facilitating decoupled computations and powering. Secure com-
munication is handled exclusively by the SISC core, preventing data transfers from stalling the life-critical
main functionality of the implant. The SISC is powered by harvesting energy over the RF link, preventing
unauthorized wireless communication requests from draining the implant battery.
treatment changes in most cases do not have a tight window within which to be
performed. Therefore, the IMD will find minimal, if any, harm from a Jam DoS attack
(5), which relies on blocking the channel. Furthermore, we consider the prevention
of insider attacks (6) to be outside the technical scope of this article as prevention
is typically achieved by security management (e.g., restricting key access to trusted
parties) rather than a security protocol. For now, we assume that the doctor is always
a trusted person and a Jam DoS attack shall never occur.
We plan to address attacks (1) to (3) through use of a suitable security protocol
and attack (4) (battery DoS) through use of a suitable IMD system architecture. The
system architecture and the security protocol are strongly linked. A decision taken
for the former can complicate or simplify the implementation of the latter, and vice
versa. This means that both components have to be developed concurrently. However,
for clarity purposes, we describe our proposed system architecture and, thus, tackle
the battery DoS problem first.
3.2. IMD System Architecture
We design a novel IMD system, the first one capable of preventing battery DoS attacks
using an RF link to harvest energy from and communicate to the reader. Thereby,
incoming requests do not drain the implant battery. Furthermore, we propose that
the implantable system shall be partitioned into two modules—one supporting the
primary IMD functionality and the other exclusively handling security; this enables us
to prevent regular attacks while dealing with (DoS) attacks without interrupting the
main IMD functionality.
A top-level view of the proposed System-on-Chip (SoC) architecture is presented in
Figure 1. The IMD SoC consists of a number of memory-mapped modules connected
onto a common bus. Themainmodule is responsible for performing the primary implant
functionality, such as the signal-processing task of a pacemaker. Smart biosensors (e.g.,
QRS-complex sensing) and bioactuators (e.g., heart pacing) are needed to interface
to the living tissue. A shared-memory block is used for the rest of the modules to
log or exchange implant data and wireless communication events. Last, a custom
security ASIP called SISC (Smart-Implant Security Core), which is tightly coupled
to a transceiver module, is responsible for running the IMD security protocol. The
SISC core has its own (private) instruction (IMEM) and data memory (DMEM) blocks;
the SISC specifics will be revisited in Section 3.4. The shared-memory block and the
SISC memories are turned off most of the time in order to save energy. As such, it is
necessary that the shared memory and the SISC IMEM are nonvolatile and have low
power consumption. Therefore, Flash memories have been chosen, which are becoming
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increasingly compatible with CMOS logic over recent years [Shukuri et al. 2001]. In this
way, the security protocol (i.e., software program running on the SISC) as well as the
(prestored) encryption keys will not be lost every time RF-induced power is interrupted.
As Figure 1 illustrates, all modules are exclusively powered by a battery pack with
the exception of the SISC, which can be also powered by energy harvested through
the RF antenna, in a fashion similar to RFID tags. The idea behind the dual powering
system of the SISC is as follows: When a new communication request is made by
an external reader—authorized or unauthorized—the implant antenna harvests RF
energy and powers up the previously sleeping SISC (through the transceiver module).
Over the same RF link, the SISC receives an encrypted request packet and attempts
to authenticate the other party. If it succeeds (i.e., this communication request has
not been an attack of any sort), then the SISC knows for certain that the reader is
authentic, at which point it switches the power source from the harvested RF energy to
the implant battery. It is allowed to do so because it does not run the risk of a battery
DoS attack but, rather, services a legitimate task: It is expected to perform some “high”
energy-consuming operations, such as multiple memory accesses, data encryption and
broadcasting, change of implant operation mode (e.g., firmware update), and so on.
Once the power source has toggled, the SISC transmits back a similarly encrypted
response packet that the reader can use, in turn, to authenticate the implant and actual
data exchange can take place, as will be explained next, in Section 3.3. Obviously, if
the actual operations involved afterward are not too energy taxing, the SISC could
maintain its RF-harvested power source (as opposed to switching to battery mode), but
we are addressing here the problem in the general case. What is crucial for our analysis
is that the proposed SISC core should be able to operate within the power margin the
RF link provides.
In case the opening communication request is, in fact, an attack, then the SISC
would power up at zero-energy cost (i.e., through the RF-harvested energy), fail to
authenticate the reader, drop the reader request, and, subsequently, go back to sleep
without discharging the implant battery or disrupting the primary implant operation
at all. The reasons for proposing a partitioned IMD system architecture are, thus,
becoming obvious: First, the security module should not use the same resources as the
main functionality module of the implant. It is not acceptable for themain functionality
program (it is, often, life critical) to stall because of running the security program
(computation decoupling). Second, we do not want the security part to drain the main
implant battery (power decoupling) on any unauthorized communication request.
3.3. Secure Communication Protocol
Having dealt with the energy issue, we now move to the next important issue, which is
bypassing security in case of emergency. In literature, we found a number of approaches
to providing emergency access, as presented in Section 2.2. Out of these current alter-
natives, we believe that use of a magnetic switch that allows fail-open access while in
close proximity to the implant is sufficient for next-generation IMDs.
In the previous section, we addressed attack (4) through the proposed IMD system
architecture. In this section, we will present in detail a security protocol that comple-
ments the system design choices and addresses the remaining attacks (1), (2), and (3).
There are two main approaches to designing a security protocol: (i) design of a protocol
from scratch or (ii) design of a protocol based on an international standard. If a new
protocol is proposed (option i), it might suffer from security vulnerabilities even when
a rigorous security analysis is conducted together with the proposal. For instance,
over the last years many RFID authentication protocols followed this approach and
a significant number of them have been partially or completely broken [van Deursen
and Radomirovic 2008; Zhuang et al. 2013; Bogari et al. 2012]. Such a trend cannot
be tolerated in the implant domain due to the high criticality of such devices. On the
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other hand, the design of protocols conforming to a standard (option ii) facilitates the
usage of these protocols in commercial devices. Standards have been deeply scrutinized
by the community before being part of a regulation, which guarantees their security
and low chance of latent errors [Boyd and Mathuria 2010; Bauer and Juerjens 2008].
Therefore, in this work we have based our security protocol and used primitives on
standards and well-established international regulations. Under this approach, the
construction of messages is set by the standard(s), but the message content and vari-
ous extra fields are dependent on the application context. Last but not least, the usage
of a standard security scheme for implants has the added benefit of narrowing the gap
between research and actual, commercial IMDs.
Let us now revisit Table I, which presents possible choices for every layer of a secu-
rity system. In the context of medical implants and with the previous system choices
in mind, we have drawn final decisions for each layer of our system, appearing in
the table in boldface text. First, we have decided to use a symmetric cipher for mes-
sage encryption and for Message-Authentication-Code (MAC) calculation. The reason
is that, generally speaking, a proven symmetric algorithm is sufficiently secure, yet sig-
nificantly less computationally intensive, thus less energy consuming compared to an
asymmetric one [Martin Feldhofer and Wolkerstorfer 2004; Lee et al. 2010]. Further-
more, asymmetric approaches typically require large memory footprints or expensive
coprocessors like the cloaker [Denning et al. 2008]. On the other hand, symmetric sys-
tems require that each entity pair has a unique key for maintaining communication
confidentiality. Consequently, as the number of communicating entities increases, stor-
age requirements also increase. To address the issue, the assumption is made here that
only a small number of valid readers (a typical example would include three: doctor,
patient, close relative of the patient) exist. This assumption is realistic since in health
care applications the number of authorized readers is small in comparison to other
applications such as RFID-based access systems.
In a symmetrical system, the key distribution can be done by a distribution cen-
ter. For our system, it is obligatory to use an offline distribution system, because an
online one would require communication with the distribution center, which is quite
impractical for IMDs. Moreover, in our case, there are only about three readers, all
with their own security privileges and their own key. Therefore, there is no need for
a more sophisticated key distribution scheme. Finally, replacement of the key is not
needed unless a reader is compromised.
The next step is the selection of the entity authentication and message integrity
methods. We have decided to cover both by using MAC for the data blocks. Freshness
and protection against replay attacks are guaranteed by the use of random numbers. A
replay attack could lead an adversary to reply information and supplant a legitimate
entity. In this protocol, both entities (reader and implant) contribute with a fresh
nonce, which is randomly generated in every new session, ensuring uselessness of old
messages (replay attack protection). Random numbers are generated on the fly during
protocol execution and only the values linked with the current session are kept in
memory, thus requiring minimal memory overhead.
As previously mentioned, instead of designing a security protocol from scratch, our
proposed solution is based on standards and international security recommendations.
More precisely, ISO/IEC 9798 Part 2 specifies six schemes based on symmetric encryp-
tion algorithms [ISO 1999], providing various degrees of authentication: unilateral
authentication, mutual authentication, and authentication with key establishment
using a third entity (server). Our proposed scheme is based on the fourth protocol
of this standard, as we require mutual authentication between the reader (R) and
the implant (IMD). Both entities share a key KRI , and its identifiers are IDR and
IDI, respectively. Nx symbolizes a random number generated by entity X. [[M]]K
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Fig. 2. The proposed IMD security protocol conforming to ISO/IEC 9798, which guarantees mutual authen-
tication between the reader and IMD.Minimal effort is required from the IMD prior to reader authentication,
allowing the IMD to operate on RF-harvested energy.
represents the encryption of message Mwith key K to provide confidentiality and {M}K
symbolizes the encryption of message M with key K to provide confidentiality and
integrity. The messages may include a command field (CMD) or answer field (ANS),
which are dependent on the application. The exchanged messages, shown in Figure 2,
in our four-pass, mutual authentication protocol are described in the following steps:
(1) R → IMD: hello. The reader wakes up the implant.
(2) IMD → R: NI . The implant generates a random number and sends this nonce to
the reader.
(3) R → IMD: NR, NI, {NR, NI, IDI,CMD}KRI , [[CMD]]KRI . The reader generates a ran-
dom number and computes a MAC. This MAC includes the random number re-
ceived and the one generated on board and the identifier of the target IMD (IDI).
Additionally, a command field (CMD) is included as a part of this message. Finally,
these two random numbers together with the MAC and an encrypted version of the
command ([[CMD]]KRI ) are sent to the implant.
(4) IMD → R: {NI, NR,ANS}KRI , [[ANS]]KRI . The implant decrypts the CMD received,
computes a local version of the MAC ({NR, NI, IDI,CMD}KRI ), and checks its equal-
ity with the received value. Note that only the target implant knows the identifier
(IDI) used and the two nonces associated with the session. If this validation fails,
the implant aborts the protocol. If not, the IMD allows the SISC to switch to the
battery supply and sends a MAC, which includes the two aforementioned nonces
and the response command (ANS). Additionally, an encrypted version of the answer
([[ANS]]KRI ) is attached to this message.
(5) R: First, the reader decrypts the answer. Then, knowing the ANS field and the two
nonces linked to the current session, the reader calculates a local version of the
MAC ({NI, NR,ANS}KRI ). If the received values and the computed values are equal,
the reader and the implant are mutually authenticated. If not, the protocol returns
an answer.
Since the proposed scheme is based on a well-known International Standard, its
security has already been analyzed in depth. Moreover, recent studies like Boyd and
Mathuria [2010] do an extensive analysis of security schemes and recommend 9798-2
as a secure entity authentication scheme.
3.3.1. Implementation Aspects. We start by fixing the bit length of the values used in
the protocol by taking as reference common values used in low-cost RFID tags due
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to their rough similarities with implants (computational, memory, power consumption
restrictions) [Halperin et al. 2008; Juels 2006]. The identifiers are 96 bits long (|IDR| =
|IDI| = 96) and the bit length of random numbers is set to 32 (|NR| = |NI| = 32)
[EPCglobal Inc]. Commands are 32 bits long (|CMD| = 32), as we expect that this
will be large enough to cover all command options for the IMD, and answer codes are
a multiple of 64 bits (|ANS| = n× 64). These lengths have been chosen to align the
request and answer sizes to the 64-bit block size of our chosen cipher, discussed next.
Regarding primitives, we discard public cryptography due to the scarce resources of
IMDs. Our symmetric system is mainly based on the use of a lightweight and secure
block cipher, abbreviated CIPH, using a shared key (K). From all possible candidates—
and without loss of generality—we chooseMISTY1, which is a 64-bit lightweight block
cipher designed byOhta andMatsui [2000]. Our choice is based on a suitability analysis
on symmetric ciphers for medical implants by Strydis et al. [2008]. Out of 13 profiled
ciphers, MISTY1 has been found best suited for implants since it ranks high across
most metrics such as power consumption, energy cost, and encryption speed.
Aiming to reuse the selected primitive, we also use a MAC algorithm that is based on
a symmetric key block cipher. This cipher-based MAC is abbreviated CMAC. Our algo-
rithm follows the NIST 800-38B Recommendation [NIST 2005], providing guidelines
for using block ciphers for our purposes.Moreover, for subkey generationwe followwhat
is dictated in the specification (i.e., NIST 800-38B; pages 7–8) [NIST 2005]. The sub-
keys (K1 and K2) are generated and stored in the memory of the entities involved (e.g.,
reader and implant) at the key distribution phase. To compute the MAC of message M
(i.e., {M}K), M is divided into blocks of 64 bits: M1||M2|| . . . Mm, where m= |M|/64. The
CMAC algorithm is described here:
CMAC algorithm compliant with NIST 800-38B
1. C0 = 0b
2. For i = 1 to m, let Ci = CIPHK(Ci−1 ⊕ Mi)
3. T = Cm
4. Return T
Therefore, theMAC of message M is T (i.e., T = {M}K). Apart from theMAC, random
numbers are used in the protocol. We opt for a standard approach again: As specified
in the NIST 800-38A specification [NIST 2001] (“Recommendation for Block-Cipher
Modes of Operation”), we use our block cipher in a counter mode, called CTR. The
current value of the counter is denoted by Tj and RN represents the outputted 32-bit
random number. After each nonce generation, the counter value (Tj+1) is updated. The
initial value of the counter is set at the key distribution phase (i.e., T0 = random seed).
The algorithm proposed is described here:
Block cipher-CTR mode
(compliant with NIST 800-38A)
1. Oj = CIPHk(Tj )
2. RN = |Oj |0···31
3. Tj+1 = |Oj |32···64
After determining the security protocol, we proceeded with its implementation in
ANSI C and compilation by the SISC C-compiler. The program starts and ends with
the creation and destruction of the keys. Note that, in realistic systems, the key creation
and destruction functions should run only once because the software of the protocol
should not end after accomplishing a single communication session. This program
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binary is set to run on every new power-up of the SISC triggered by an external
communication request.
3.4. SISC Architecture
In this section, we concisely present the SISC architecture, a custom-designed security
ASIP. By definition, an ASIP is more power consuming but also more flexible compared
to an ASIC through changing the binary code it executes. Thus, an ASIP strikes a
better tradeoff between optimized performance/power and design flexibility.
The use of processor-based implant controllers has been demonstrated in various
designs in the past [Stotts et al. 1989; Harrigal and Walters 1990; Fernald et al. 1991;
Wouters et al. 1994; Valdastri et al. 2004;Wang et al. 2004; Jalilian et al. 2004] whereby
in vivo reprogramming of the implant has been successfully performed. Although these
cases focused on reprogramming the main implant processor, in this work we extend
the reprogramming capabilities of the implant security core. We believe this feature
to be pivotal to the design of realistically safe and secure future implants for the
following reason: IMDs make up a narrow market niche and, as such, have to this
point attracted only limited (malevolent) attention. As IMD use is becoming more
widespread over time, more systematic and versatile security attacks are bound to
be mounted. Unfortunately, under such conditions, the incorporated security of many
future commercial IMDs will be compromised. The only eventual safeguard against
this will be the in vivo reprogramming of such devices for adding extra phases in the
security scheme, changing the protocol altogether, and so on. Such major updates are
impossible under an ASIC approach and device replacement through surgery will be
needed, which is an action to be taken only as a last resort.
Since our SISC design needs to be low energy but also perform nontrivial compu-
tations, we have chosen to implement an integer, in-order RISC-style architecture.
We have selected to design a typical five-pipeline-stage processor, which consists of
Instruction-Fetch, Decode, Execution, Memory, and Write-Back stages. It consists of
a 16-bit instruction set along with 16 registers of 32 bits each. In our case, the use
of 32-bit registers is important because the encryption and decryption algorithms of
our benchmark are operating on 32-bit quantities. When run on a standard, in-order
RISC core, the encryption algorithm generates a significant amount of read-after-write
hazards. In order to reduce the instruction binary size—or, equivalently, the implant
memory needs—in our SISC design, NOPs are removed from the binary at compile
time and are dynamically inserted at runtime whenever a hazard is detected. With
this optimization, the IMEM size is 24KB and the DMEM size is 16KB.
The SISC ISA consists of 25 instructions listed in Table II. Profiling of the SISC
security code traces has yielded various potential optimizations. One such optimization
is the replacement of the very frequentmov-and-beqz group by an instruction extension
(mandb), highlighted in gray in the table. With this optimization introduced in the
baseline core, the execution time has been reduced by 34.31% and the energy cost by
34.26% at a scant power increase of 0.73%. The SISC processor and C compiler have
been designed by using the Synopsys Processor-Designer and Compiler-Designer tools.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Having described all components of the secure IMD system, we can now move to the
evaluation of our design. Compared to the current state of the art in IMDs, our SoC
employs additional resources—namely, the SISC running security tasks and a number
of requiredmodifications in the system interconnect, thememory sizes, the power lines,
and so on—to provide security. A direct comparison between an unsecured, reference
IMD SoC and our security-enabled and, thus, more resource-costly SoC is needed for
identifying the overheads our design incurs in terms of performance, area, power, and
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Table II. SISC Instruction-Set Architecture
Supported types and syntax are listed. Instruction extension is highlighted in gray.
type instruction format
rr op [4] reg [4] reg [4] funct [4]
rrr op [4] reg [4] reg [4] reg [4]
ri op [4] reg [4] imm [8]
jump op [4] imm [12]
name type assembly action
jr rr jr rd branch to addr[rd]
and rr and rd,rs rd ← rd and rs
lw rr lw rd,rs rd ← mem[rs]
sw rr sw rd,rs mem[rs] ← rd
mov rr mov rd,rs rd ← rs
not rr not rd,rs rd ← not rs
or rr or rd,rs rd ← rd or rs
xor rr xor rd,rs rd ← rd xor rs
sub rr sub rd,rs rd ← rd-rs
add rr add rd,rs rd ← rd+rs
lb rr lb rd,rs rd ← mem[rs] (byte)
se rr se rd,rs if(rd==rs) rd←1 else rd←0
sgt rr sgt rd,rs if(rd>rs) rd←1 else rd←0(signed)
sgtu rr sgtu rd,rs if(rd>rs) rd←1 else rd←0(unsigned)
beqz rr beqz rd,rs if(rd==0) branch to addr[rs]
subi ri subi rd,imm rd←rd-imm
addi ri addi rd,imm rd←rd+imm
li ri li rd,imm rd←imm
sftl ri sftl rd,imm rd←rd<<imm
sftr ri sftr rd,imm rd←rd>>imm(sign extension)
sftru ri sftru rd,imm rd←rd>>imm(zero extension)
cb rrr cb rd,rs1,rs2 exchanges the rs2th-byte of rd by the
LSB of rs1
mandb rrr mandb rd,rs1,rs2 if (rd and rs1==0) branch to addr[rs2]
j jump j imm branch to addr[imm]
jal jump jal imm branch to addr[imm] and r15←PC+1
energy costs. Moreover, to evaluate our solution on even terms, a secure reference SoC
has to also be established for making comparisons.
Existing commercial IMDs typically implement their functionality around a single
core, which often is an embedded, off-the-shelf DSP running the entire implant ap-
plication software. If security would be added, this main module would also have to
be burdened with running security-related tasks such as data encryption, MAC calcu-
lation, and so on. Therefore, we define as our reference design an SoC where sensor,
actuator, and memory modules exist but no special security module is included. In its
unsecured version, the main module of the SoC runs only the main functionality of the
IMD, while in its secure version, it additionally runs the secure communication task.
Our experimental setup consists, then, of two proof-of-concept SoC designs: (i) a
single-core, reference SoC with and without execution of security tasks, and (ii) our
dual-core, secure SoC including the SISC module. Without loss of generality, for
the main functionality module—common across all three SoC instances—a realistic
implant case study has been used: the so-called ‘artificial pancreas (abbrev. AP) as
discussed in the next section.
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Fig. 3. Simplified block diagram of the Biostator-II artificial-pancreas hardware controller. On every new
actuation event, a shift word register storing the five most recent glucose measurements (sensor values) is
consulted to compute the amount of insulin to be released (actuator values).
4.1. Case Study: Biostator II
An AP implant is a next-generation, yet simple in conception, device that allows for
closed-loop control of the blood glucose levels of diabetic patients. It essentially consists
of a glucose sensor (e.g., H2O2 Platinum-needle detector), a control unit, and an insulin
actuator (e.g., a micropump insulin injector) to close the loop. For our working case, we
have adopted the Biostator II implementation by Pagkalos et al. [2011].
Biostator II is an ultra-low-power ASIC implementation of an AP controller. The
main advantage of an implanted controller, compared to manual insulin injections or
insulin pumps, is a more reactive control of the insulin injection rate, resulting in
improved treatment and, of course, a more discreet and convenient alternative.
The Biostator II (ASIC) module is depicted in Figure 3. At every minute, the module
powers up and receives a new blood glucose value, storing it in a local memory block
(Shift-Word Register, SWR) containing the five most recent values. After storing this
value, a small state machine is executed, which takes 42 clock cycles to calculate the
insulin release rate based on the five stored blood-glucose values using a number of
additions and multiplications. Biostator II represents the main implant functionality
in Figure 1 and communicates to its glucose sensor and insulin actuator through two
bus interfaces. While these interfaces have been implemented, the actual sensor and
actuator modules, as well as the IMD transceiver, are analog components outside
the scope of this article. Instead, three simple buffers for producing and consuming
physiological data, respectively, have been used as scaffolds in the SoC.
For our experiments, the proposed IMD SoC can integrate the ASIC block of the
Biostator II as the main functionality module. However, the reference design requires
a software version of the application to be running in the main module. Therefore,
except for an optimized version of the original ASIC design, a C version of the Biostator
II engine has also been implemented and validated against its hardware counterpart.
For both the software and the hardware version of the Biostator II, the shared mem-
ory of the IMD is used for logging sensor data, actuator data, wireless communication
events (e.g., what configuration changes have been applied), and intercore communica-
tion (e.g., parameter changes in the Biostator II). Based on typical glucose and insulin
trends [Daly et al. 1998; Pagkalos et al. 2011], storing the sensor and actuation data
every 5 minutes for a maximum of 72 hours (3 days) is sufficient for reconstructing
the patient’s recent blood insulin and blood glucose trends. Based on these numbers
we have estimated that an 8kB shared-memory block will be large enough to store all
recent sample values (in single-floating-point precision) and device access history (i.e.,
timestamps).
Each log entry is 96 bits long (16 bits for the sensor and actuator values, 32 bits
for a timestamp), resulting in 96 bytes of data stored per hour, or 6.75kB for a
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3-day timespan. In order to maintain device access history, we log the 25 most re-
cent successful reads and 25 successful implant configuration changes. Each memory
entry will contain the reader ID (96 bit), command (32 bit), and timestep (32 bit), result-
ing in a total of around 1kB of data. The resulting memory size of the shared memory
is, thus, 8kB. Due to the limited SISC memories and performance (see Section 4.2), we
impose a maximum of 2kB to be read out by a reader per request.
The IMD can be accessed wirelessly by both the patient (e.g., for monitoring the blood
glucose levels) and his or her treating physician (e.g., for configuring parameters of the
Biostator II module, performing sensor recalibration, or collecting logged physiological
data). In our case study, we assume that a patient is frequently monitoring his or her
glucose levels (every 8 hours is quite typical with diabetics) and will ask for a full
glucose/insulin history since the last read (i.e., 8 hours of data). It should be stressed
that the AP case is used here without loss of generality to better illustrate the working
of a secure IMD.
4.2. Synthesis Results
Having outlined our experimental base, we can now present detailed synthesis results
of the various SoC instances and the new SISC module in particular. First, we will
describe the findings for the SISC core and protocol to demonstrate the feasibility of
the energy-harvesting security strategy, after which we will extend our discussion to
the complete SoC. Since the Synopsys Processor Designer and Compiler Designer have
been used for designing the SISC, the tools have been also employed for generating
a simple 32-bit, five-pipeline-stage, in-order RISC core and C compiler for use as the
main functionalitymodule for the reference SoCdesigns. The core supports no advanced
(micro)architectural features such as bypassing and branch prediction, thus exhibiting
a low area cost (to be further discussed in Section 4.2.2).
Besides, we have employed the Synopsys Design Compiler to synthesize all IMD
modules and Synopsys PrimeTime in order to get accurate power measurements. Due
to availability constraints, the modules have been synthesized in UMC 90nmCMOS–
Standard Performance (SP) technology.More suitable libraries, for example, UMCLow-
Leakage (LL) or UMC Low-Power (LP), were not available to us. Power measurements
have been performed by feeding the IMD modules with data typical to the case study
and extracting a signal switching-activity file (SAIF) in ModelSim. This activity file
is—along with the synthesized netlist—fed to PrimeTime in order to determine the
actual system power consumption.
As the employed UMC library does not support Flash memories, we have estimated
the overheads of the shared memory and SISC-IMEM based on synthesis results of
the SISC-DMEM (SRAM) and known SRAM-to-Flash ratios [Park et al. 2003]. Fur-
thermore, the sensor, actuator, and wireless transceiver modules are not part of this
evaluation, although they are part of the actual IMD; they are all mixed-signal com-
ponents that cannot be synthesized with the UMC CMOS library and, besides, are
outside the scope of the current article.
It is further worth noting that the Biostator II ASIC and software task have been
supplied with typical glucose values by a simulated glucose sensor, while the SISC
core runs the IMD side of the security protocol considering successful and unsuccessful
external reader accesses. Last, the system runs at 20MHz, which is a typical operating
frequency for modern implants [Strydis 2011].
4.2.1. SISC. In Table III, for each IMD-side protocol stage, a detailed synthesis report
of each SISC subsystem is given; per subsystem the active per-transaction timeT ONtrans
(i.e., the per-transaction duty cycle of the subsystem) and the per-transaction energy
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consumption EONtrans are reported. Per-transaction energy figures of the complete SISC
are also reported.
Note that, in the table, we have chosen to illustrate the costs for executing a single
wireless transaction,which is theminimal, atomic operation that the SISC can perform.
We report on two transaction instances of the system: one transaction that entails the
MAC and a short ANS package of two 32-bit words (m = 2), for example, a simple
acknowledgment of receiving the command—and another that entails the MAC and a
long ANS package of two hundred and eighty-eight 32-bit words (m = 145), which is
the typical amount of data requested periodically by the reader in the presented AP
case (see Section 4.1).
As explained for the security protocol in Section 3.3, the IMD is responsible for execut-
ing steps 2 and 4 of the protocol (the rest being executed by the reader). On the basis of
the power source used, we split the IMD-side protocol execution into two main phases:
reader preauthentication and postauthentication. During the preauthentication phase,
the SISC wakes up on RF power and executes step 2 and part of step 4 of the algorithm
(verification of the reader). For these tasks, the whole SISC tile consumes a mere EONtrans
of 7.45μJ regardless of the ANS size and the authenticity of the request, as shown in
Table III (“Total RF harvested (per trans.)”). Based on this result and on the FCC guide-
lines [FCC 2003], we can conclude that the power and energy budgets demanded in the
preauthentication phase of our secure IMD are within the capabilities of current gen-
eral RF-harvesting techniques (transceiver energy costs included). Consequently, the
proposed SISC architecture offers zero-battery-power defense to unauthorized readers.
In the absence of the SISC and security protocol—as is the case with currently
available commercial implants—the 7.45μJ reported in Table III would be the actual
energy penalty an unsecured IMD would have to pay every time it suffered a battery
DoS attack. In such a case, the unsecured IMDwould wake up on battery power, process
the illegal request, drop it, and power down, the whole process taxing its battery a
nontrivial 7.45μJ. Since thousands of such attacks can be mounted quite easily, the
crippling effect to the implant lifetime is straightforward.
Contrary to the preauthentication phase, the total EONtrans for the postauthentication
phase (second part of step 4 of the protocol) is command dependent. For the AP case, it
can range from 4.49μJ (for a small ANS) to 432.63μJ (for a large ANS) per transaction.
Therefore, the energy overhead of security lies in the micro-Joule range and is, thus,
reasonably low for battery operation (see Section 4.2.3 for a viability discussion).
4.2.2. System architecture. In Table IV, a breakdown synthesis report of three different
SoCs is presented:
(1) an unsecured single-core reference SoC running the Biostator II software;
(2) a secure single-core reference SoC running the Biostator II software; and
(3) our proposed secure SoC, which includes the ASIC Biostator II module and the
customized SISC running the security protocol software.
For each of these cases, Table IV reports the per-module area A and average active
power consumption PONavg (i.e., the power consumed when the module is turned on). Note
that the table also reports a full-day’s battery-energy drainage EONday , which, in the case
of our proposed IMDSoC, is independent of the number of battery DoS attacksmounted
against the implant due to its zero-power authentication cost. Thus, the figures reported
in the table for our IMD SoC account for the energy costs when running on battery
power. That is, preauthentication energy costs (up to the second half of step 4 in the
security protocol) are not included in these figures (and can be seen in Table III). Note
also that, per day, a nominal number of three legitimate (wireless) reads is assumed,
each transferring 8 hours of implant data (ANS: 288 words), as discussed in Section 4.1.
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Table IV. Per-Component Breakdown of SoC Area, Average Active Power, Active Time, and Active Energy Cost
(per Day) When Running on Battery for the Reference System (with and without Security) and the Proposed
Secure SoC
Reference SoC w/o security





Baseline RISC - core (Biostator II S/W) 54558 240.40 344.26 82.76
Baseline RISC - IMEM 8kB* 3.75 344.26 1.29
Baseline RISC - DMEM 1152 2.51 344.26 0.86
Interconnect 6111 87.30 0.22 0.02
Shared memory 8kB* 3.75 0.04 ∼0.00
Total SoC >61821 –** –** 84.93
Reference SoC w/ security





Baseline RISC - core (Biostator II S/W) 54558 240.40 344.26 82.76
Baseline RISC - core (Security S/W) 224.60 4711.19 1058.13
Baseline RISC - IMEM 32kB* 15.00 5055.45 75.83
Baseline RISC - DMEM 157232 342.80 5055.45 1733.01
Interconnect 6111 87.30 0.35 0.04
Shared memory 8kB* 3.75 0.09 ∼0.00
Total SoC >217901 –** –** 2949.77
Secure SoC (including SISC)





SISC - core 56038 194.15 2367.90 459.59
SISC - IMEM 24kB* 11.25 2367.90 26.64
SISC - DMEM 157232 342.80 2367.90 811.67
Biostator II (ASIC) 28650 190.30 0.09 0.02
Interconnect 8843 94.40 0.35 0.04
Shared memory 8kB* 3.75 0.09 ∼0.00
Total SoC >250763 –** –** 1297.96
Secure vs Reference SoC w/o security >405% –** –** 1528%
Secure vs Reference SoC w/ security <15% –** –** –56%
*Actual cell numbers for estimated Flash memories not available, thus, excluded from the total area.
**Not meaningful for the complete SoC (in particular for power, a total value cannot be calculated as it
depends on the tasks running at any point in time).
The difference between the first and second reference design is that the latter, on
top of the Biostator II task, also runs the security task (based on our selected security
scheme as shown in Section 3.3). For doing so, the baseline-RISC IMEM and DMEM
subsystems need to be increased in size to accommodate for the increase in binary size,
thus resulting in a more than 3.5× increase in area. The interconnect and shared-
memory area use remains unaffected since, in both cases, the amount of on-chip traffic
and sensor data handling, respectively, stays the same.
In terms of daily activity (T ONday ), running the security scheme adds approximately
4.7 seconds of execution time to the baseline RISC. This, combined with the increased
RISC memory sizes, results in 35× higher costs in total daily energy consumption
(EONday ). It is interesting, though, that the RISC-core P
ON
avg , when running the security
task, is slightly lower than that of the Biostator II task, meaning that running the
security task in the reference SoC will not lead to an increase in average system power
consumption.
These overheads in area, execution time, and energy allow us to appreciate the costs
introduced to an IMDwhen secure functionality is desired. The costs remain nontrivial
even through use of a very lean security scheme such as the one selected in Section 3.3.
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This observation supports our original claim that borrowing security schemes from
other application fields that match IMD requirements poorly can potentially lead to
largely inefficient secure IMDs.
Having discussed naive implementation of security in IMDs (i.e., the secure, single-
core, reference SoC), we can now compare that design with our proposed, dual-core,
secure SoC. As Table IV reveals, our new secure SoC design comes at a less than 15%
increase in area and at a 56% decrease in daily energy compared to the secure reference
SoC. Therefore, our secure SoC offers high security levels at additional chip-area costs
that are negligible with respect to the total implant package and at an energy budget
of less than ∼1.3mJ for one full day of nominal operation. It is noteworthy that the
energy-hungrier, secure reference SoC is still susceptible to battery DoS attacks.
Besides, in our SoC instance, the Biostator II software task has been replaced by
its more efficient hardware (ASIC) counterpart as an extra optimization. While this
optimization is beneficial for the IMD, it is not a prerequisite for implementing our
security design. As can be seen from the table, this conversion saves about 85μJ of
daily energy in total, which would lead to a dual-core, secure SoC with still significant
energy reductions (47%) compared to the secure reference SoC. Besides, with respect
to the unsecured, reference SoC, our dual-core, secure SoC requires approximately 4×
more area and 6.3× more energy to provide security.
With regard to PONavg , the SISC core exhibits an average power profile (194.15μW)
similar to the Biostator II ASIC, and lower than its respective RISC-core profile
(224.60μW), revealing the optimized functionality of the SISC. This can help reduce
the chance of hotspots in the implant chip. The SISC IMEM (Flash) is low power and
the SISC DMEM (SRAM) is the main power culprit (∼41%) in the SISC tile and the
SoC, for that matter. This means that employing a lower-power SRAM block is bound
to improve power figures considerably.
4.2.3. Discussion. The previous analysis of our system has spawned two important re-
sults: (i) Although it is a proof-of-concept system, our proposed SoC achieves zero-
energy defense. That is, the SoC requires only 7.45μJ for powering up the SISC and
accepting or rejecting a reader request. This budget is very feasible to harvest through
existing RF link technology. (ii) Our proposed SoC achieves low-overhead secu-
rity communication: there is no performance overhead in the primary implant func-
tionality due to the delegation of security tasks to the SISC. What is more, even under
very high (for aULP device) authenticated data transmissions (two hundred and ninety
32-bit words), the energy overhead that the security subsystem imposes to the SoC is
less than 1.3mJ.2 In their extensive survey on IMDs, Daniluk and Niewiadomska-
Szynkiewicz [2012] specify that a typical ICD consumes ∼25μJ per pacing pulse,
thus requiring an energy budget of ∼2.16J per day under normal circumstances (i.e.,
without the occasional delivered ICD shock) and is known to last for 5 to 7 years
before the battery needs replacement. This practically means that, for a commercial-
grade IMD that adopts our security enhancements, there will not be any noticeable
drop in the lifetime of the implant battery since the security-imposed energy overhead
(<1.3mJ) is three orders of magnitude lower than the baseline implant energy budget
of 2.16J.
5. CONCLUSIONS
With this work we have addressed several challenging issues regarding the design and
implementation of a secure IMD.Our aimhas been to provide high security levels at low
2The transceiver energy overhead caused by the extra transmission of the MAC block has been estimated
and is in the range of a few micro-Joules, thus negligible.
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energy consumption while not jeopardizing the primary implant functionality. To this
end, we have, first, proposed a novel system architecture, where a security ASIP (SISC)
decouples the security tasks from the implant functionality. We have combined this sys-
tem with a carefully selected new security scheme, based on known power-sensitive
security standards. This security scheme offers defense against common attacks such
as entity impersonation, message alteration, and message eavesdropping. The system
architecture complements security by allowing the SISC to consume RF-induced power
while dealing with unauthenticated readers, thus providing additional defense against
the more sophisticated battery DoS attacks. In order to estimate the feasibility of our
system architecture, SISC core, and security protocol, we have implemented and ana-
lyzed a complete proof-of-concept system architecture featuring an artificial-pancreas
controller (Biostator II) as the main implant module. The analysis has verified that our
prototype requires very low energy to perform reader authentication (7.45μJ), effec-
tively implementing the previously suggested zero-battery-energy defense mechanism
through pure RF link energy harvesting. What is more, our prototype guarantees zero
performance overheads in running both the main implant tasks and the security tasks.
Our analysis has revealed that the daily energy cost of our proposed SoC architecture
(1.3mJ), which supports the main IMD functionality and useful security tasks under
high-volume data transmission, is negligible for the energy budget of commercially
available chronic implants. Compared to a reference single-core IMD, which runs the
same security protocol but is still not able to deal with battery DoS attacks, our secure
SISC-enabled SoC requires 15% more area and consumes 56% less energy on a daily
basis.
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